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COMMENT
SOUTHWORTH V. GREBE: THE CONSERVATIVE
UTILIZATION OF "NEGATIVE" FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS TO ATTACK DIVERSITY OF THOUGHT AT
PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES
"It were not best that we should all think alike; it is difference of
opinion that makes horse-races."'

INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution is
popularly celebrated for its protection of free speech, the cornerstone of academic thought. Unfortunately, a right-wing
legal attack on the University of Wisconsin-Madison's ("UWM")
mandatory student fee program has utilized the same First
Amendment to squelch the extracurricular debate that makes
the university a "marketplace of ideas."2 In Southworth v.
Grebe,' the Alliance Defense Fund ("ADF")4 , a conservative

MARK TWAIN, PUDDNIEAD WILSON 115 (Bantam Books 1984) (1894) (from
Puddn'head Wilson's Calendar).
2 See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (Brennan, J.)
("The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.'").
3 151 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1998), reh'g denied, 157 F.3d 1124, cert. granted, 119
S. Ct. 1332 (Mar. 29, 1999).
' See Eric Brakken, Right-Wing Unleashes Campaign Against Student Activities, INFUSION: THE NATIONAL MAGAZINE FOR PROGRESSIVE STUDENT ACTIVISTS,
Oct. 1998, at 13. Southworth is one lawsuit in a larger effort to "de-fund the left."
Id. ADF currently has a nearly identical lawsuit pending against the University of
Minnesota. See id.
ADF's activity is expected to increase in the next year. In an interview
with the Minnesota Daily, Fund President Alan Sears pledged that ADF
will file suit against six colleges in the next year and spend half a million dollars on the issue. They hope that their investment will result in
a ruling by the Supreme Court.
Id. In fact, the Regents appealed the Southworth ruling to the United States Su-
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legal organization, mounted a clever attack on UWM's mandatory fee program by relying on a body of First Amendment case
law that ensures individuals' "negative," or "corollary," speech
and association rights.' These "negative" rights of the First
Amendment are the inverse of the affirmative speech and
association guarantees most often equated with the Constitution. "Negative" First Amendment rights have evolved, mostly
in the area of labor law,6 to protect individuals from government-compelled speech and association, essentially guaranteeing corollary rights not to speak or to associate. Couched
in language heralding individual freedoms, the ADF
mounted an attack on diverse student debate by employing this body of "negative" First Amendment case law to a
paradoxical conclusion.
In Southworth, the ADF represented three UWM students,
"self described members of the extreme Christian Right,"' in a
lawsuit challenging the Wisconsin Board of Regents' ("Board of
Regents" or "Regents") funding of eighteen left-leaning student
organizations with mandatory activity fees. The conservative,
or "objecting,"' students claimed that the Regents had violated
their "negative" First Amendment rights not to speak and
associate by allocating a portion of their mandatory activity
fees to student-run "political and ideological" organizations to

preme Court, which granted certiorari, 119 S. Ct. 1332 (Mar. 29, 1999), proving
ADF's investment on this issue a worthwhile one. For more information about the
activities of the ADF, including a list sampling the cases that have come before
the United States Supreme Court with the ADF's Assistance, visit their website at
<www.alliancedefensefund.org>.
See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); Chicago Teacher's
Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and
Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employes, 466 U.S. 435
(1984); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); see also Victor
Brudney, Association, Advocacy and The First Amendment, 4 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1, 11 (1995) ("Individuals may be said to have a negative speech interest-i.e., an interest in remaining silent and not being forced or 'improperly' pressured to speak.").
6 See supra note 5.
Brakken, supra note 4, at 13.
8 The court refers to the conservative students in Southworth as "objecting
students" because they disagree with the political and ideological views of the
liberal organizations funded by their mandatory student activity fees. Southworth,
151 F.3d at 720. This Comment also refers to the conservative students as "objecting students."
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which they were morally and ideologically opposed.9 Convinced
of a traditional First Amendment triumph, a three judge panel
of the Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the objecting students,
holding that the Regents had violated the objecting students'
speech rights by allocating a portion of the mandatory fees
to the so-called "liberal" student groups.'0 As a result,
the Southworth holding yields grave political, legal and
educational results.
A "robust exchange of ideas"" is fundamental to all educational institutions and the democracy that they protect. Universities play a vital role in encouraging the "robust exchange
of ideas" and developing the discourse that informs democratic
choice. 2 "[Tlhe nation's fundamental civic values are forged in
the intellectual fires of its college campuses .. . ."" Accordingly, the UWM broadly aims, "to discover and disseminate
knowledge, to extend knowledge and its application beyond the
boundaries of its campuses and to serve and stimulate society
by developing in students heightened intellectual, cultural and
humane sensitivities .. .. "" Regrettably, the UWM's mission
was significantly frustrated by the Seventh Circuit decision in
Southworth. The ruling complicates and renders impractical
the continuance of the UWM's support and encouragement of
extracurricular political and ideological debate among student
groups of various political and religious affiliations. Without
sufficient funding, the student organizations which foster the
"diverse debate" that is critical to the university's educational
mission will largely cease to exist, leaving only a more uniform
and colorless educational institution.

' Southworth, 151 F.3d at 718.

'0 Id. at 733.
" See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("The Nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust ex").
change of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues .
2 See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 684 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (holding that a
professor's contempt conviction for his refusal to respond to inquiries concerning
his political affiliations and the content of his lectures was an invasion of the
professor's academic freedom and political expression.) ("Teachers and students
must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.").
13 Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 527 (Cal. 1993) (Arabian, J., dissenting).
11 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.01(2) (West 1998).
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Politically, the Southworth decision encourages well-funded 5 conservative organizations like the ADF to initiate law
suits aiming to silence the viewpoints of left-leaning organizations. The decision demonstrates how a conservative legal
organization can utilize the federal courts, and the discourse of
individual rights, to effect an anti-democratic purpose: the defunding of political and social groups which foster ideologies
inimical to its own.
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit's analysis failed to offer a
cogent standard for reviewing the constitutionality of mandatory fee expenditures at public universities. The court did not
clearly articulate whether the Regents' allocation of mandatory
student fees to political and ideological groups could be justified by a "vital", "legitimate" or "important" interest in education. Likewise, in a patently legalistic manner, the court focused only on the impact of the fee program on the objecting
students and never considered the devastating practical effects
its ruling would have on the student organizations relying on
the funding. 6 Furthermore, the court relied on the "negative"
First Amendment doctrine, which evolved mostly in the context
of labor law, rendering it inapplicable and largely inapposite to
the university setting.
Southworth presents the problem of dueling First Amendment interests: the proscription of compelled funding of speech
and association and the protection of uninhibited expression.
The "negative" First Amendment absolutes,17 forged largely in
the labor context unfold significant contradictions when imported into the educational setting. The result is an Amendment that steps on its own toes, as demonstrated in
Southworth by the clever but troublesome use of the First

" Brakken, supra note 4, at 13. ADF is listed as maintaining an annual budget of $5 million, with half a million dollars to spend on this issue. See id.
16 Moreover, notably, traditional, positive First Amendment guarantees apply to

public universities and protect the speech rights of the left-leaning ("political and
ideological") student organizations. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (holding that student groups were protected by the First Amendment); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that students'
First Amendment right to protest the Vietnam War was only forbidden once the
protest "substantially and materially" interfered with discipline).
1 See Smith, 844 P.2d at 533 (Arabian, J., dissenting) ("I acknowledge that the

resolution of conflicting interests that I have set forth may not satisfy those who
prefer First Amendment absolutes.").
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Amendment to effectively silence the exchange of diverse view-

points that the amendment aims to protect.
Part I of this Comment details the cases that form the
"negative" speech and association rights doctrine, setting the
backdrop for the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Southworth.
Part II discusses the Southworth decision. Part III examines
the fundamental problems with the Seventh Circuit's analysis
in Southworth. Lastly, Part IV considers, in light of
Southworth, the plausible arguments left to defend the constitutionality of the allocation of mandatory student fees to political and ideological campus groups.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND MANDATORY FEE CASES
While the greater part of First Amendment case law respecting the guarantees of speech and association considers the
limits on government abridgment of these guarantees, there is
a corollary body of case law that recognizes the "negative"
rights of an individual not to speak or associate." These "negative" rights insure "individual freedom of mind, " 9 which is
in turn justified by three canonical First Amendment principles: guarding "'truth' in the 'marketplace of ideas,' facilitating
representative democracy and self-government, and promoting
individual autonomy, self-expression and self-fulfillment."'
While the rights not to speak and not to associate are not expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, 2 they have
evolved as ancillary speech rights.2
" See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); Keller v. State Bar
of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977);
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943); see also Brudney supra note 5, at 11.
19 See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 ("The right to speak and the right to refrain
from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual
freedom of mind.'"); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
20 GERALD GUNTHER, KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1025 (13th
ed. 1997); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at
576 (1978).
2, The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
'"See GUNTHER, supra note 20, at 1361; see also Southworth v. Grebe, 151
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A. The Right Not To Speak
A study of the "negative" rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment necessarily begins in 1943 with West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette,2 3 where the United States
Supreme Court declared that a school board resolution compelling all students to salute and pledge their allegiance to the
American flag was unconstitutional.' Walter Barnette, a
Jehovah's Witness, challenged the constitutionality of the
forced salute and pledge, claiming that it infringed on his religious belief that the flag is a "graven image" within the command of the Book of Exodus.' The Court found that
Barnette's right to dissent outweighed the nationalism the
school board sought to imbue.2" Thus, the Court held that the
compelled salute "invades the sphere of intellect and spirit
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control."27 Justice Jackson,
in an oft-quoted sentence, poetically began the construction of
"negative" speech rights under the First Amendment:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.28

Later constitutional challenges looked to this "fixed star"
to enjoin government compulsion of speech and association. In
Wooley v. Maynard,29 plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Maynard sought
injunctive and declaratory relief against the enforcement of a

F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1998), reh'g denied, 157 F.3d 1124, cert. granted, 119 S.
Ct. 1332 (Mar. 29, 1999) ("The Supreme Court has long recognized two necessary
corollaries to the First Amendments guarantee of free speech: the right not to
speak; and the right not to be compelled to subsidize others' speech.") (citations
omitted).
319 U.S. 624 (1943). Three years before Barnette, the Supreme Court sustained a compulsory flag salute by denying a free exercise exemption in
Minnersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). However, Gobitis was
overruled in Barnette, thus, commencing the strand of case law granting a First
Amendment right not to speak.
24 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626.
Id. at 629.
2 See id. at 641.
27 Id. at 642.
28

Id.

29 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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New Hampshire law criminalizing the act of obscuring the
"Live Free or Die" motto on the state license plate." The
Maynards, both Jehovah's Witnesses, had covered the motto on
their car's license plate because it conflicted with their reli3
gious belief that "life is more precious than freedom." The
Maynards challenged the constitutionality of the law as it
effectively forced them to display a slogan that they found
32
"morally, ethically, religiously and politically abhorrent."
Relying heavily on Barnette, the Supreme Court found, "[t]he
right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual
freedom of mind."'33 Here, like the school board's interest
in promoting nationalism in Barnette, the Court held that
New Hampshire's interest in compelling the display of
the state motto did not overcome the plaintiff's First
Amendment protections. 4
B. Compulsory Fee Cases
While the "right of association" is not itself a right ex35
pressly granted by the First Amendment, the phrase has
developed into a guarantee formed by the aggregate meaning
36
of those rights that are expressly granted. Given the right to
associate, the ancillary right not to associate has likewise
evolved." The bulk of challenges claiming a right not to associate has been brought by individuals subject to a compulsory
30Id. at 709.
31

Id. at 708 n.2.

Id. at 713.
Id. at 714.
" See Wooly, 430 U.S. at 717. The State claimed that the compulsory display
of the motto was justified by its interest in (1) facilitating the identification of
vehicles and (2) promoting the appreciation of history, individualism and state
pride. See id. at 716. The Court found that these interests were legitimate, but
that the State had not chosen a constitutional means of promoting them. See id.
at 717.
22
23

25

See supra note 21.

See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that it was unconstitutional for Alabama to compel the NAACP to furnish a membership list).
"7See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); Keller v. State Bar
of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Chicago Teacher's Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292
(1986); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employes, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
26
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fee. Compulsory fee cases often arise in the labor context,
when non-union employees challenge the expenditure of fees
from an "agency shop" provision," or in the context of the integrated bar, when lawyers challenge the use of bar dues." In
all of the compulsory fee cases, the Supreme Court recognizes
the impact such fees may have on the First Amendment rights
of non-union employees or integrated bar members, yet, in its
analysis, the Court rarely takes into consideration the speech
and association rights separately or specifically.4" As a result,
the body of compulsory fee cases creates an indistinct hybridization of the negative speech and association rights of the
First Amendment.
An agency shop provision requires that, as a condition of
employment, all non-union employees in a bargaining unit pay
the union a service fee for the benefits of representation.4 In
Railway Employes' Department v. Hanson,42 the United States
Supreme Court reviewed a decision of the Nebraska Supreme
Court upholding an injunction of a union shop provision on
First Amendment grounds of freedom of association.4 3 The

Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); Chicago Teacher's Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and
Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employes, 466 U.S. 435
(1984); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
" Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S.
820 (1961).
41 See, e.g., Abood, 431 U.S.
at 222.
41 This Comment uses the terms "agency shop" and "union shop" interchangeably, so a brief explanation of their differences is necessary for accuracy.
Under a union shop provision, an employee must become a member of the bargaining unit's union within a certain time after being hired. In contrast, an agency
shop provision requires that an employee who chooses not to join the union pay a
service fee to the union, usually equal in amount to union dues. Under federal
case law, the courts have viewed the union shop agreement as the "practical
equivalent" to an agency shop provision. For an explanation, see Martin H. Malin,
The Legal Status of Union Security Fee Arbitration after Chicago Teachers Union
v. Hudson, 29 B.C. L. REV. 857, 857 n.2 (1988); see also NLRB v. General Motors
Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 744 (1963) ('Such a difference between the union and agency
shop may be of great importance in some contexts, but for present purposes it is
more formal than real."); Abood, 431 U.S. at 217 n.10. However, a significant
difference between the two provisions seems worthy of mention. Unlike an employee forced to join the union under a union shop provision, a non-union employee
under an agency provision only pays a fee to the union and, thus, has no voice in
the union's internal democratic process.
42 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
"' See id. at 230.
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Supreme Court agreed that there were "justiciable questions
under the First Amendment"" but, nevertheless, reversed the
lower court and held that the union shop provision was pro-

45
tected by the Railway Labor Act. The Court recognized that
a union shop agreement may infringe on a non-union
employee's First Amendment rights; however, since Congress
had protected such agreements under the Railway Labor Act,
the Court declined to second guess Congress' contentious policy
decisions.46 The Court opined that, in protecting union shop
provisions, Congress had the legitimate objective of peacefully
settling labor disputes.
In Hanson, the non-union employees did not challenge the
union's expenditure of fees generated by the union shop provision, but challenged the enforcement and application of the
provision itself.48 The Court noted, however, that "[ilf
'assessments' are in fact imposed for purposes not germane to
collective bargaining, a different problem would be presented."49 Thus, subsequently, in InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. Street,5" the Supreme Court heard a constitutional
challenge to the expenditure of non-union fees generated by a
union shop provision. 5 In Street, the non-union employees
challenged the union's expenditure of their fees to fund politi52
cal campaigns for candidates whom they did not support.

at 231.
See id. at 233. The Railway Labor Act, enacted by labor and management
consensus in 1926, aimed to avoid the disruptions in commerce caused by railway
labor disputes. See Harry A. Rissetto, Overview of the Railway Labor Act, SA31
ALI-ABA 1, 3, 9 (1996). At issue in Hanson was section 2, Eleventh, an amendment of 1951 that annulled the Act's prohibition of union shop agreements. See
Hanson, 351 U.S. at 230. Section 2, Eleventh, specifically provided for union shop
agreements. See id. at 229.
6 See Hanson, 351 U.S. at 233. Justice Douglas wrote, "Congress, acting within its constitutional powers, has the final say on policy issues." Id. at 234. Two
policies frequently advanced to justify agency shop provisions are the avoidance of
a "free-rider" problem and the peaceful settlement of labor disputes. The "freerider" issue addresses the benefits non-union employees get from union representation. Agency provisions seek to make sure that the union is compensated for its
services, as it must consider the interests of all employees in the bargaining unit.
See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1991).
,TSee Hanson, 351 U.S. at 233.
See id. at 227.
" Id. at 235.
60 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
5'See id. at 744.
62 See id.
" Id.
"
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Since Street presented constitutional expenditure issues not
presented in Hanson, the Court reexamined the propriety of
the Railway Labor Act.53 The majority maintained the
Hanson rule that the Railway Labor Act constitutionally protected union shop provisions, but added that a union's use of
fees for political or other causes not germane to collective bargaining is not within the Act's protections.5 4 In Street, as in
Hanson, the Court did not rule on the constitutionality of union shop agreements or certain expenditures thereunder. Instead, the Court addressed only whether the relevant portion
of the Railway Labor Act was constitutional in its protection of
agency shop provisions.5
The Hanson and Street trend of eluding the central First
Amendment issues of compelled funding continued in the subsequent cases of Lathrop v. Donahue56 and Brotherhood of
Railway Clerks v. Allen.57 In Lathrop, a lawyer challenged the
constitutionality of both the compulsory dues imposed by the
Wisconsin Bar and the Bar's expenditure of such dues to fund
political causes which he opposed.5" The Court was bound by
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's factual determination that
the bar dues were not used to influence political and ideological agendas and, thus, only considered the plaintiffs challenge
to the imposition of the fee itself.59 Relying heavily on
Hanson, the Supreme Court found the Bar had a legitimate
end in its policy of "elevating the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of legal

See id. at 747-49.
See id. at 768. An activity is considered to be germane to collective
bargaining when it speaks to the benefits non-union employees receive from the exclusivity of union representation. See Street, 367 U.S. at 761; see also supra note 46.
Moreover, while the Court found a violation of the Railway Labor Act in Street, it
did not enjoin the union from funding political causes with objecting employees'
fees. See Street, 367 U.S. at 775. Instead, the United States Supreme Court remanded to the Georgia Supreme Court for further actions in accordance with the
holding of Hanson. See id.
" See Street, 367 U.S. at 749-50.
56 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
57 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
" See Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 827. The lawyer's "kitchen sink" challenge was
based on his rights of "freedom of association, assembly, speech, press, conscience
and thought," as well as the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 828 n.4.
" See id. at 828. ,
'

14

SOUTHWORTH V. GREBE

1999]

services." 6 The Court found no occasion to consider the First

Amendment issues raised by the attorney and quoted the dicta
of Hanson, "'[o]n the present record, there is no more an infringement or impairment of First Amendment rights than
there would be in the case of a lawyer who by state law is
' 1
required to be a member of an integrated bar."' Thus, the
state's actions were only subject to Supreme Court review
not
concerning the due process clause, of which the Court did
2 The
burden.
find a violation, and the question of undue
Court found that the public interest promoted63 outweighed the
"slight inconvenience" to the objecting lawyer.
Similarly, in Allen, non-union railway employees bound by
an agency shop provision challenged the union's expenditure of
fees to fund political activities with which they disagreed and
successfully attained an injunction of the expenditures from
the North Carolina Superior Court." On appeal, again, the
United States Supreme Court did not rule on the First Amendment issues presented by compulsory funding. The Court did,
however, reverse the lower court's injunction because it was
inconsistent with Street's requirements that non-union employees make their dissent affirmatively known and that there be a
showing of which union expenditures 65were political in order to
effectuate a refund or future remedy.
The Supreme Court addressed a First Amendment challenge to an agency shop provision for the first time, in 1977, in
66
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. The provision required
all non-union teachers to pay a service fee to the union in the
67
same amount as union dues. The Supreme Court began its
analysis by reviewing Hanson and Street, and determined that
6
those cases were controlling. Although federal labor law was
inapplicable to the state employees in Abood, several of the
state's labor provisions mirrored those of the Railway Labor

6 Id. at 843.
225, 238
6 Id. at 843 (quoting Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S.
(1956)).
62 See Lanthrop, 367 U.S. at 844.
63 Id.
64

See Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 117 (1963).

65 See id. at 119, 121.
66 431 U.S. 209 (1977).

See id. at 212.
6' See id. at 222.
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Act.69 Accordingly, the Court held constitutional the funding
of union activities that were germane to the purpose of promoting collective bargaining.7" More significantly, however, the
Court further held that the funding of political and ideological
activities with which non-union teachers disagreed was a violation of the First Amendment because the activities were unrelated to the purpose of collective bargaining.7 ' In Abood, the
non-union teachers' corollary freedom not to associate was
recognized because, although the non-union teachers were
forced into, not prohibited from, funding political causes, there
was still an infringement on their constitutional rights.7 2 After citing the famous "fixed star" quote of Barnette,7 ' the
Court explained that "the freedom of belief is no incidental or
secondary aspect of the First Amendment's protections."7 4
Following Abood, later Supreme Court opinions began to
clarify which specific union expenditures of compulsory fees
were constitutional and how unconstitutional expenditures
could be returned. For example, in Ellis v. Brotherhood of
Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks,75 the Court explained
that union conventions, publications, and litigation incidental
to collective bargaining negotiations were constitutional expenditures of non-union members' dues.76 However, the funding
of union organizing and social activities was not germane to
the purpose of the compulsory fee, and thus presented a violation of the non-employees' freedom not to associate.7 7 Furthermore, the Ellis Court held that an agency shop agreement
could not require an objecting non-union employee to pay a full
service fee, then later rebate the portion representing political expenditures with which the non-union employee did not

69 See id. at 223.

70See id. at 232.
71 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 234.
72 See id. at 234.
" See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
74Abood, 431 U.S. at 235.
7' 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
716
See id. at 448-53.
7 See id. at 449.
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agree." The Court stated that there were other reasonable alternatives to a rebate system and held that even the temporary commitment of an objecting employee's fee was a violation
79
of the right not to associate.
°
In Chicago Teacher's Union v. Hudson," the Court further shaped the remedy stages of compulsory dues cases when
it held that the constitutional collection of an agency fee minimally required "an adequate explanation of the basis for the
fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount
of the fee before an impartial decisionmaker, and an escrow for
the amounts reasonably in dispute while such challenges are
pending."8 In Hudson, the Court not only required that the
government have a strong enough interest to support an agency shop, it further required a procedure utilizing those burdens
in a way that is "carefully tailored to minimize" the First2
Amendment infringement of the objecting employees' rights.
Subsequently, compulsory fee cases have relied on this requirement to justify an application of a strict scrutiny standard
when the First Amendment is implicated.'
In consonance with Abood and its progeny, twenty-one
attorneys commenced another challenge to the expenditure of
integrated bar dues in Keller v. State Bar of California.' Unlike the result in Lathrop nearly thirty years earlier, in Keller,
a unanimous Supreme Court held that the Bar's expenditure of
dues not germane to its purpose of "regulating the legal profession" and "'improving the quality of ...legal service[s]'" violated the objecting lawyers' First Amendment right not to associate.' The Court cautioned that "those activities having political or ideological coloration" are not always easy to discern, but
found that the challenged funding of gun control and weapons
freeze initiatives was clearly of the political and ideological ilk
8
that violated objectors' constitutional rights.
"sSee id.
79 See id. at 444.
"

475 U.S. 292 (1986).

'* Id. at 310.
,2 Id. at 303.

8' See, e.g., Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 506 (Cal.
1993).
' 496 U.S. 1 (1990).

, Id. at 14 (citation omitted).
,' Id. at 15, 16.
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Lastly, in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 7 the Supreme
Court synthesized nearly fifty years of cases to create a more
compartmentalized and seemingly sensible three-prong analysis to determine the constitutionality of the expenditure of
objectors' shop fees.8 8 For an expenditure of agency shop fees
to be valid, Lehnert held that it must: "1) be 'germane' to collective-bargaining activity; 2) be justified by the government's
vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding free riders;
and 3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech
that is inherent in the allowance of an agency or union
shop."8 9 This three-prong Lehnert analysis is the current
means by which the courts determine the constitutionality of
the expenditure of fees generated by agency shop provisions.
The First Amendment review applied in compulsory fee
cases retains a distinctive quality because it evolved from a
statutory analysis of the Railway Labor Act's allowance for
agency shop agreements. The application of an analysis shaped
mostly in the field of labor law to challenges to the appropriation of mandatory student fees presents difficulties due to the
inherent differences between the union shop, or integrated bar,
and the university.
C. Challenges to Mandatory Student Fees
The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the
constitutionality of compelled funding in the area of mandatory
student activity fees at public universities.' While Abood

500 U.S. 507 (1991).

88 See id. at 519.
89 Id.

In Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that funding of a
religious student newspaper must be considered on a viewpoint neutral basis once
a fee-funded forum has been created) (a case on which the ADF was also of counsel), the Court, citing to Abood and Keller, specifically did not address "the question whether an objecting student has the First Amendment right to demand a
pro rata return to the extent the fee is expended for speech to which he or she
does not subscribe." Id. at 840. In concurrence, however, Justice O'Connor did
recognize "the possibility that the student fee is susceptible to a Free Speech
Clause challenge by an objecting student that she should not be compelled to pay
for speech with which she disagrees." Id. at 851 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus,
while not at issue in Rosenberger, Justice O'Connor did foreshadow Southworth by
mentioning the possibility of a First Amendment challenge to certain expenditures
of mandatory student fees.
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technically occurred in an educational setting, the expenditures
at issue were teachers' agency shop fees and, thus, ultimately
spoke not to academic issues but rather to labor and employment issues. Conversely, in the student fee cases that follow,
students have challenged the expenditure of their mandatory
activity fee, which does speak to the definitions and concepts
of education.
While the Supreme Court has not yet considered whether
the use of mandatory student fees to fund political and ideological student groups violates objecting students' First Amendment rights against compelled speech and association, some
circuit and state courts have considered the issue. Perhaps
because of case-by-case factual differences as to the challenged
group activity, or the varying broadness of the interests offered
by the defendant universities, the courts have not decided such
issues uniformly.
9
In 1983, in Kania v. Fordham," the Fourth Circuit heard
a University of North Carolina student's challenge to the
school's use of a portion of his mandatory activity fee to fund a
newspaper that expressed viewpoints with which he disagreed.9 2 The Fourth Circuit distinguished the student's constitutional challenge from Abood by recognizing that the educational setting is inherently different from that of labor relations in a union shop.93 Applying a modified Abood "germaneness" analysis, the court found that a university newspaper is
"a vital part of the University's educational mission, and that
financing it is germane to the University's duties as an educational institution."94 The court further distinguished the labor
context from the funding of the school newspaper because the
nature of the "union viewpoint" was one-sided; whereas,
the paper opened a forum for "'uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open' expression.""
The Fifth Circuit rejected an analogous newspaper funding
challenge by students of Southwest Texas State University in
Hays v. Supple.9 6 Using the Supreme Court's three prong

9 702 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1983).
See id. at 477.
3 See id. at 479.
94 Id.

at 480.

(citation omitted).
96 969 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1992).
" Id.
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Lehnert analysis,97 the Fifth Circuit held that the Universitysponsored newspaper narrowly advanced important government interests because it created a forum for discussion and
allowed students to attain journalism experience." In adopting the Lehnert analysis, the Fifth Circuit did not specifically
distinguish the labor and university contexts as the Fourth
Circuit had done in Kania. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit did
focus on the newspaper as the creation of a "forum for public
discussion," not the one-sided promotion of a particular viewpoint associated with a political student organization.9 9
In Galda v. Rutgers,' two years after the first newspaper challenge in Kania, students contested the constitutionality
of Rutgers' funding of a politically active campus organization.
The Third Circuit heard the students' challenge to the
university's policy of compelling them to fund NJPIRG °'
with a portion of a mandatory, refundable fee. The circuit court
held that the mandatory, refundable fee imposed on objecting
students violated their First Amendment rights.0 2 Instead of
permitting the University to collect the funds-even though
these funds were refundable to the students-the court suggested that the university adopt a system of voluntary student contributions to NJPIRG. 01' In weighing the university's interests against the objecting students' interests, the court found

See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
98Hays, 969 F.2d at 123.
99Id. at 123-24. The Fifth Circuit distinguished Hays from Galda because a
newspaper, unlike a political organization, does not espouse a particular viewpoint,
but instead provides a forum for the expression of a wider array of ideas. See id.
at 124.
1- 772 F.2d 1060 (3d Cir. 1985).
...The New Jersey Public Interest Research Group ('NJPIRG") is a non-partisan, independent, non-profit corporation that "actively engages in research, lobbying and advocacy for social change." Id. at 1061. In Galda, although NJPIRG was
initially ineligible for student activity fees funding because of its independent nature, it was later funded as a result of a student referendum. See id. at 1061-62.
The referendum required over 25% of the student body and a majority of the
votes cast to approve funding NJPIRG. See id.
" See id. at 1067.
'"
See Galda, 772 F.2d at 1068 n.5.
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that the educational benefits of NJPIRG were only incidental to its political motives and, further, that such educational benefits could be achieved through a less drastic,
alternative means.'
°5
The Second Circuit case of Carroll v. Blinken presents
a challenge similar to that presented in Galda by the Rutgers
students. In Carroll, several SUNY Albany students claimed
that the compulsory funding of NYPIRG'0 5 violated their
right against compelled association.0 7 Relying on the speech
interests protected in Barnette, and the analysis of Abood and
its progeny, the Second Circuit reduced the tension of interests
by limiting the university's funding of NYPIRG to on-campus
activities.' The court found that the interests the state offered.0 9 to defend funding NYPIRG with student fees were
"substantial enough to justify the infringement" on the
students' "right against compelled speech.""0 By limiting the
activities that the university could fund based on their location, not their content, the court was able to diminish the infringement on the objecting students' rights."'
Moreover, adding to the disjunction between the circuits,
2
in Rounds v. Oregon State Board of Higher Education" -a
case decided after Southworth-the Ninth Circuit, unlike the
Seventh Circuit, rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of
3
the University of Oregon's funding of OSPIRG EF" with

See id. at 1065-66.
957 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1992).
106 New York Public Interest Research Group ("NYPIRG"), like its New Jersey
counterpart in Galda, is a "non-partisan research and advocacy organization." Id.
at 994. In a referendum held every two years, the students at SUNY Albany decide whether to fund NYPIRG through their activity fee, and the students have
always approved the funding. See id.
107 See id. at 995-96.
10 See id. at 1001.
109 SUNY Albany offered three interests to support the expenditure of activity
10
10

fees to fund NYPIRG: "1) the general promotion of extracurricular activities, 2) the
facilitation of what the district court called 'participatory civics training', and 3)
the stimulation of robust campus debate on a variety of public issues." Carroll,
957 F.2d at 999.
1 Id. at 1001.
m See id.
112 166 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1999).
11 Oregon Student Public Interest Research Group Education Fund ("OSPIRG
EF"), a non-partisan group like the PIRGs challenged in Galda and Carroll, aimed
to "develop students' potential to become educated and responsible citizens who are
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mandatory student activity fees. In this challenge, nearly identical to those in Galda and Carroll, the Ninth Circuit held that
the allocation of mandatory student activities fees to OSPIRG
EF did not violate the objecting students' First Amendment
right to be free from compelled association.11 6 First, the court
applied the germaneness doctrine of Abood." 5 Finding that
OSPIRG EF's programs met the educational objectives of the
University and recognizing that the goals of a university are
much broader than a labor union or state bar, the court held
that the compelled funding of OSPIRG EF's activities was
germane to the purpose of education."'
Next, applying what it dubbed an "intermediate level of
scrutiny," borrowed from Lehnert, the Ninth Circuit determined that the funding of OSPIRG EF with mandatory student activity fees was "adequately supported by a governmental interest." 17 Noting that the inquiry is a "fact-sensitive"
one, the Ninth Circuit found that the objecting students were
not compelled to become members of OSPIRG EF, nor were
they compelled to speak any message with which they disagreed." 8 Moreover, the court analogized Rounds to
Kania,"' a newspaper case, determining that OSPIRG EF
was not, and was not perceived to be, speaking for all the students in attendance at the University of Oregon. 2 ' Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit, unlike the Seventh Circuit in
Southworth, allowed the University of Oregon to fund OSPIRG
EF with mandatory student fees because the organization was
part of a "limited public forum--one that embraces a wide
array of groups representing diverse interests. 21

informed about the American legislative process and political system." Id. at 1034;
see supra notes 101 and 106.
11

See Rounds, 166 F.3d at 1037.

. See id. ("The germaneness doctrine of Abood does not silence organizational
speech; rather, it requires only that ideological activities not germane to an
organization's purpose be funded through sources other than compulsory fees.").
.16See id. at 1039.

1 Id. at 1037.
1

Id.

at 1037-38.

9 See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
.2 See Rounds, 166 F.3d at 1038 (citing Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475, 478
n.6 (4th Cir. 1983)).
121 Id. at 1039. The Ninth Circuit distinguished Rounds from Southworth based
on factual grounds and noted, "Itlo the extent that Southworth holds that a public
university may not constitutionally establish and fund a limited public forum for
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Additionally, on the state level, in Smith v. Regents of the
University of California,"' over a strongly worded dissent,
the California Supreme Court extracted principles from the
Carroll, Galda, Keller and Abood line of cases and observed
that the use of mandatory student activity fees are generally
permissible if "germane to the university's educational mission."1" However, the court cautioned that "at some point"
the educational benefits of the funded group become incidental
to its political objectives and no longer justify the burden on
objecting students' speech and association rights." The California court held that "the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and association do not permit the state to make speech
a matter of compulsion and coercion," and found that the objecting students were unduly burdened by the compulsion to
fund the political and ideological groups whose purposes were
only incidentally educational. 2 ' The California Supreme
Court stressed that the decision was not about the abridgment
of the political and ideological organizations' association
and speech rights, but was, in fact, about the objecting
students' guarantee of freedom from compulsion to exercise
those same rights.126
The objecting students in Smith challenged the funding of
a laundry list of 14 student organizations that pursued political and ideological goals.'27 This challenge was unlike Galda
and Carroll-andRounds, which followed Smith-because objecting students in those cases exclusively challenged the funding of PIRGs. 2 ' In Smith, the objecting students challenged
the funding of environmental, feminist, gay and lesbian, human rights and other progressive student organizations.' 2 9
This distinction is significant because the objecting students
who challenged the funding of NYPIRG, NJPIRG or ORSPIRG
were objecting to a singular, self-described partisan student

the expression of diverse viewpoints, we respectfully disagree
n.5.
'2 844 P.2d 500 (Cal. 1993).
'23
124

Id. at 511.
Id.

12

Id.

126

See id.

....

at 503.

127 See Smith, 844 P.2d at 504-05.
2
'2

See supra notes 101, 106 and 113 and accompanying text.
See Smith, 844 P.2d at 504-05.

"

Id. at 1040
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group. Conversely, in Smith-and Southworth as well-the objecting students cited a vast array of student organizations
that are only related because they can be construed as representing liberal or progressive politics.
In dissent, Justice Arabian termed the majority's decision
a "jurisprudential debacle" and argued that all on-campus
speech is germane to the educational mission, and, thus, justified by compelling state interests."' 0 Justice Arabian further
argued that the court should have deferred to the University's
"considered academic judgment" instead of creating the "illconceived dichotomy" between the political and the educational."' The dissenting Justice's opinion stressed the "altogether
different" scope of a University campus and a union shop,
remarking that a university's "interests are not narrowly vocational, but broadly educational."'
Unlike the majority in
Smith, the dissent recognized the possible devastating effects
of the holding on the positive speech rights of the political and
ideological organizations.'
Appreciating the gravity and fragility of free speech on a university campus, Justice Arabian
warned, "[wie must approach our task, therefore, 'with special
caution,' understanding that the institution's continued vitality
and independance [sic] are contingent upon its freedom from
disruptive judicial interference.""
II. SOUTHWORTH V. GREBE
A. Facts
In 1996, Scott Southworth, Amy Schoepke and Keith
Bannach, three law students'3 5 enrolled in the University of
Wisconsin-Madison ('JWM"), commenced an action in the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin challenging

Id. at 518.
Id.
132 Id. at 519.
'3 See id. at 521.
134 Smith, 844 P.2d at 521 (citation omitted).
1" At the time the action was commenced, Southworth and Bannach were in
their third year of law school and Schoepke was in her second year. See
Southworth v. Grebe, No. 96-C-0292-S, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *1, *2
(W.D. Wis. Nov. 29, 1996).
'30
131
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aspects of the Board of Regents' mandatory stident activity fee
policy.'36 The three students sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the mandatory fee policy violated their
rights to freedom of speech, freedom of association, free exercise of religion, and their rights under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, because a portion of the funds generated by
the fee were allocated to organizations that engaged in political
and ideological activities to which the students objected.'37
At UWM, student activity fees are allocated to a wide
The plaintiffs in
variety of student organizations.13
Southworth challenged only the funding of politically and ideologically active organizations to which they objected.'39 The
students specifically cited and objected to eighteen different
progressive campus organizations that received funding from
mandatory student fees and engaged in political and ideological activities, speech and advocacy. 40 The eighteen politically
and ideologically active organizations offered as evidence by
the objecting students were: WISPIRG; the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Campus Center; the Campus Women's Center; the UW
Greens; the Madison AIDS Support Network; the International
Socialist Organization; The Ten Percent Society; the Progressive Student Network; Amnesty International; United States
Student Association; Community Action Latin America; La
Colectiva Cultural de Aztlan; The Militant Student Union of
the University of Wisconsin; the Student Labor Action Coalition; Student Solidarity; Students of National Organization of
Women; MADPAC; and *Madison Treaty Rights Support

" See id. at *1-*2. The activity fee policy of the Regents is mandatory because
students cannot graduate or receive their grade reports if they have not paid the
semester's fee. See id. at *2-*3.
137 See id. at *1. The district court held that there was a violation of the objecting students' rights to free speech and association and, thus, did not find the
need to further address the other alleged violations. See id. at *36. The Supreme

Court declared the Religious Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional in City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Therefore, on appeal, the circuit court only

heard arguments on the objecting students' free speech and association claims. See
Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 719 (7th Cir. 1998). After its analysis of the
free speech claim, the court did not find it necessary to consider what the alleged
violation of the association clause 'would add to the students' claim." Id. at 733
n.15. This Comment, thus, focuses on the objecting students' free speech claim.
" See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 720.
139 See id.
140See id.
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Group.' 4 These eighteen challenged groups were involved in
lobbying, demonstrating, rallying, marching, distributing newsletters and hosting web-pages that promoted political causes. The objecting students claimed to have deeply held religious beliefs that conflicted with the views of the organizations
cited and argued that their First Amendment rights were violated because the Regents' fee policy compelled them to fund
these organizations.'
Under section 36.09 of the Wisconsin Code, the Board of
Regents has ultimate control over the allocation of the funds
generated by student activity fees.'" The sum of the funds
generated by the activity fees is classified by the Regents as
either allocable or non-allocable.'4 5 The Regents automatically budget the non-allocable funds for operating costs of campus
programs such as recreational sports and health services. 4 '
In contrast, the allocable funds are distributed by grants from
the student representative body, the Associated Students of
Madison ("ASM"). 4 7 These allocable funds are budgeted to a
wide array of student organizations, including those political
and ideological groups cited by the objecting students.'
Thus, the allocable portion of the funds generated by
the student activity fees is the only expenditure at issue
in Southworth.'
These allocable fees are the source of funding for the ASM
budget and General Student Services Fund ("GSSF"). 5 ° In
See id.
id. at 720-21 (the court specifically describes the political activities of
WISPIRG, UW Greens, Progressive Student Network, International Socialist Organization, Campus Women's Center, the Ten Percent Society and Amnesty International).
See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 718.
141

142 See

14 Section 36.09(5) provides in part:

[S]tudents shall have primary responsibility for the formulation and review of policies concerning life, services, and interests. Students in consultation with the chancellor and subject to the final confirmation of the
board shall have the responsibility for the disposition of those student
fees which constitute substantial support for campus student activities.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.09(5) (West 1998).
14
14.

See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 719.
See id.

14

See id.
See id.; see also supra note 141 and accompanying text.

1

See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 719.

147

...
See id.
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turn, the ASM budget and GSSF are distributed to other student organizations.'5 1 Both the ASM and GSSF have different
allocation procedures.15 2
The ASM budget funds student groups, but they must be
registered student organizations to qualify.'53 These operation grants are not available to recipient organizations of the
GSSF.'54 The registered student organization "must be a formalized not-for-profit group, composed mainly, but not necessarily exclusively, of students, and controlled and directed by
students." 5 After reviewing an application, the ASM may
grant the organization funding for operational costs from the
ASM budget. 55
The GSSF is also allocated to student organizations by a
student committee.' 5 ' Registered student organizations, university departments and community-based service organizations are eligible for funding from the GSSF. 55 The committee reviews an organization's application and then determines
whether to grant or deny the organization's request for funding. 5"' 9 If the committee approves a grant to the applicant organization, it then decides the amount budgeted to
the organization. 6 0
In addition to submitting an application to the ASM, or
the committee that distributes grants from the GSSF, a registered student organization may seek funding from these budgets by student referendum.'' WISPIRG, one of the organi-

151
152

See id.
See id.

" See id&at 719-20. In the 1995-1996 academic year the ASM distributed
$109,277 in student fees to campus organizations. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at
719.
,' See Associated Students of Madison Bylaws, Art. 7, § 4(d)(3) (1998) (on file
with the Brooklyn Law Review).
'" Southworth, 151 F.3d at 720.
156 See id. at 719. Such operational costs may include related travel expenses or
funding to sponsor an event. See id. at 720.
15? See id. at 720. The committee is known on the UWM campus as the Student Services Finance Committee ("SSFC"). The committee consists of students
elected to the ASM. See id. at 719. During the 1995-1996 academic year the SSFC
distributed roughly $109,277 in student fees to campus organizations. See
Southworth, 151 F.3d at 720.
15,

See id. at 720.

...See id.
" See id.
161 See id.
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zations to which the objecting students cite, secured funding by
162
a student referendum in the 1995-1996 academic year.
After the three aforementioned methods of student fee
allocation are complete, budgetary decisions are sent to the
Chancellor of the Regents for review and final approval.16
The ASM has total authority over the allocation of most student fees, but the Board of Regents has the final authority to
approve or disapprove the budgetary decisions."
B. The District Court Decision
In a memorandum and order, Judge Shabaz of the Western District of Wisconsin recognized that the "corollary" speech
and association rights of the First Amendment were at issue.'6 5 Since the objecting students' First Amendment rights
were implicated by the Regents' expenditure of their mandatory fees, Judge Shabaz applied the Hudson strict scrutiny standard.1 6 6 The Hudson strict scrutiny standard requires that
the Regents offer a compelling state interest to justify the First
Amendment infringement resulting from the fee
expenditures.1 67 The Hudson analysis further obligates the
Regents to achieve the compelling state interest through the
6
means least restrictive of the students' rights. 1
At issue, the Judge explained, was the tension between
UWM's interest in the expression of an array of diverse viewpoints and the objecting students' constitutional guarantee
against the compelled funding of political and ideological activities.'6 9 Judge Shabaz considered this tension of interests

1" See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 720. WISPIRG secured $49,500 in student fees

that year. See id. WISPIRG, Wisconsin Public Interest Research Group, is analogous to NJPIRG and NYPIRG, the organizations challenged in Galda and Carroll.
See supra notes 101 and 106.
1
See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 720.
See id.; see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 36.09(5) (West 1998); supra note 144.
1
Southworth v. Grebe, No. 96-C-0292-S, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *12
(citing West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
16 See id.
1
See id.; see also supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
1'8 See Southworth, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *12.
16 See id. at *13.
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analogous to those competing concerns of the lawyers and
the bar in Keller17 ° and of the teachers and the union
in Abood. 7 '
Quoting the California Supreme Court in Smith,'72 the
district court adopted the Abood and Keller "teaching" that the
Regents may allocate mandatory fees to political and ideological organizations for a compelling reason if the allocation of
funds is germane to the purposes that justify the imposition of
the fee.' 7 ' The Regents argued that the Abood and Keller doctrine was inapplicable because, unlike a union or bar association, the organizations to which the objecting students disagreed "d[id] not purport to speak for all students."'7 4 Judge
Shabaz quickly rejected this argument because the rights to
freedom of speech and association are guaranteed "regardless
of whether or not the infringement of said rights is perceived
by others." 7 ' The Judge found that the Regents' defense was
irrelevant to the determination of whether the objecting
students' First Amendment rights had been violated because
peoples' perceptions of the support garnered by certain organizations would not eradicate an occurring violation.'7 6 The
Regents also argued that the objecting students, unlike a union
or bar association, could work within the democratic process in
place through UWM's representative student body.'7 7 The
Judge likewise rejected this defense because the distinction of
an available democratic process was not considered by the
Supreme Court in Keller.'78
In support of funding student organizations through the
mandatory fee program, the Regents argued that the UWM
was not compelling the objecting students to speak and associate, but rather, the UWM was creating a public forum for the
interaction of disparate viewpoints.'79 Judge Shabaz rejected

170 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
1

See Southworth, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *14-*15; see also supra

notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
172See supra notes 122-132 and accompanying text.
17 Southworth, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980 at *16.
17 Id. at *16-*17.
175 Id.
174 See

at *16.
id. at *16-*17.
177See id. at *18-*19.
178

See Southworth, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *18-*19.

171 See id. at

*31.
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the Regents' public forum argument because the activities of
the cited organizations appeared more like political and ideological advocacy than the exchange of ideas.18 Further, it did
not appear that most of the activities occurred on the UWM
campus.181 The Judge distinguished the political and ideological organizations at issue in Southworth from the school
newspapers at issue in Kania'82 and Hays' because a
newspaper "clearly" provides a forum for students to express a
spectrum of ideas, while the political and ideological organizations did not always open such a forum."M
In another argument to save the allocation of mandatory
fees to the political and ideological student groups, the Regents
argued that the fees were not actually used to fund political
8 ' The Regents argued that the oband ideological activities."
jecting students had no proof that their fees were actually and
directly funding the political and ideological groups with which
they disagreed.' The court summarily dismissed this argument as a matter of "bookkeeping."81 7
The court did not determine the purpose of each of the
eighteen cited organizations, but made a general determination
that the organizations were primarily political. 88 Adopting
the balancing analysis created by the California Supreme
Court in Smith, the district court determined that the educational value of the funded organizations was only incidental to
political motives.'89 Thus, the court held that the funding of
such organizations was no longer germane to the university's
educational purpose.' Since the funding of these organizations was not germane to the Regents' interest in education
and a more narrowly tailored program could have been implemented, the court held that the Regents had infringed on the
objecting students' First Amendment speech and association
180 See id. at *33.
181 See id.

1

See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
Southworth, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *32.

18

See id. at *33.

182
1

18 See id.
18

Id. at *34.

188 See id. at *26.
18

See Southworth, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *22-*23.

190 See id. at *26.
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rights.' 9' The court suggested "some sort of opt-out provision
or refund system" for objecting students, but it did not fashion
an appropriate remedy as the parties had agreed to do this on
their own."'
C. The Seventh Circuit Opinion
Unlike the district court, the Seventh Circuit employed the
Supreme Court's three-prong Lehnert inquiry' 9 to determine
whether the Regents' expenditure of the mandatory fees violated the objecting students' free speech rights.'94 The Lehnert
analysis evolved from Abood and Keller as a practical method
for determining the "germaneness" of union expenditures under agency shop provisions.'9 5 Applying this three prong analysis to the expenditure of mandatory student fees, the Seventh
Circuit discussed (1) whether the expenditure of the mandatory fees was germane to the interests of the Regents;'9 6 (2)
whether the Regents offered vital policy interests to justify compelled speech and association; 97 and (3) whether
the funding of the political and ideological groups added
to the burden on speech rights inherent in a compulsory
fee program.'98

191

See id. at *30.

Id. Since the parties had agreed to fashion a remedy on their own, the court
simply ordered that the Regents initiate a system of mandatory fee distribution
tailored narrowly enough to comport with the guarantees of the First Amendment.
See id. However, when the Regents first appealed the district court decision, the
Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as impermissibly interlocutory because the
district court had not yet addressed the objecting students' prayer for injunctive
relief. See Southworth v. Grebe, 124 F.3d 205 (7th Cir. 1997). On remand, the district court fashioned a detailed injunctive remedy that required the Regents to
cease the appropriation of mandatory fees to political and ideological groups. See
Southworth v. Grebe, 96-C-09292-S (W.D. Wis. July 24, 1997) (unpublished mem.
and order). The district court ordered that the Regents notify all students of the
political and ideological groups to be funded and the amount of each student's fee
that went to each group. See id. The injunctive order further required that the
Regents submit to arbitration proceedings for disputes over the amount of each
student's fee allocated to support each group or the nature of the groups listed.
See id.
192 See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
1

1

See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 724.

195 Id.
194
1
199

See id.
See id. at 727.
See id. at 729.
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In the first prong of the analysis, the court began its "germaneness" inquiry with two questions: "whether there is some
otherwise legitimate government interest justifying any compelled funding; and then whether the specifically challenged
expenditure is germane to that interest."'9 9 Summarily, the
court noted that it did not need to address the first question
because the objecting students had not claimed that the Regents were without a legitimate interest in maintaining the
mandatory fee program.2 0 The court, thus, only had to decide
the second issue, whether the Regents' expenditure of mandatory fees to political and ideological groups was "germane" to
its educational mission.20 '
The Regents argued that the expenditure of fees to political and ideological groups was germane to its interest in education because the support of such groups allowed for "diverse
expression," which was in turn educational. 2 The court rejected this argument because the Regents' interpretation of
20
Looking to Keller, where the
germaneness was too broad°.
Supreme Court recognized that the Bar's mission was rather
broad, the Seventh Circuit rejected a reading of education
broad enough to encompass the compulsion of speech and asso2 4
The court decided that the funding of political and
ciationY.
ideological organizations was not "germane" to education because most student organizations did not receive funding from
activity fees and because the groups that did receive funding
were open to students and non-students alike.
The Board of Regents argued that its interest in education
was inherently broader than those interests offered by the
defendants in Abood and Keller.2 6 As a result, more activities
were germane in this context, including activities of political

10 Southworth, 151 F.3d at 724.
200 See id.
202

Id.
Id.

203

See id. at 727.

201

204 See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 725; see also supra notes 84-86 and accompa-

nying text. The California State Bar's interest and aim was to "'aid in all matters
pertaining to the advancement of the science of jurisprudence or to the improvement of the administration of justice.'" Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 15
(1990).
200 See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 725.
204 See id.
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and ideological groups." 7 The breadth of the educational mission, the Regents asserted, could not be compared to- the interests offered by the defendants in Abood and Keller-collective
bargaining and the oversight of the bar-because a union or bar
association has a narrower focus than a university and therefore encompasses fewer germane activities." 8 The court recognized the inherent breadth of an educational mission, but rejected the Regents' argument that this breadth made
more activities germane. 9 The court opined that "everything is in a sense educational," which would place no
limit on "germaneness."21"
In addition, the Regents cited Carroll,in which the Second
Circuit acknowledged that the funding of NYPIRG could be
" ' In Carroll, the Second Circuit balgermane to education.21
anced the university's interest in education against the objecting students' rights against compulsion and ordered that
NYPIRG use the amount of its budget equivalent to its funding
grant for activities only on campus." 2 The Seventh Circuit in
Southworth did not adopt the Carroll court's compromise."'
Instead, the court found Galda and Smith more persuasive." 4 In siding with Galda215 and Smith,"6 the court decided that the ideological and political groups were only incidentally educational, which could not justify the burden on the
objecting students' First Amendment rights."7 Furthermore,
in a footnote, in accord with the court below, the Seventh Circuit hastily distinguished Kania"' and Hays"9 as newspa-

207 See

id.

206See id.
209

See id.

151 F.3d at 725.
See id. at 725-26.
212 See supra notes 105-110 and accompanying text; see also Carroll v. Blinken,
957 F.2d 991, 1002 (2d Cir. 1992).
21 See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 726-27.
214 See id.
211 See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 122-132 and accompanying text.
217 See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 726. The burden on the objecting students is
the third prong of the court's analysis; however, the court discusses this burden in
relation to germaneness in the first prong.
211 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
210 Southworth,
211
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per cases. 2 The court did not discuss why Kania and Hays
upheld the constitutionality of the expenditure of mandatory
student fees simply because the objecting students in
Southworth had not challenged the funding of a newspaper."' Despite its conclusion that the allocation of fees to political and ideological groups was not germane to the Regents'
interest in education, the court continued to the next two
prongs of the Lehnert analysis.2 22
Under Lehnert, the second prong considers "whether the
compelled fee is justified by vital policy interests of the government."2 ' In Abood and other agency shop cases, the
government's policy interest was to promote labor peace and
avoid free-riders.22 4 In Keller, the interest was to regulate
and improve legal services. 5 In Southworth, since the Regents had not mentioned the Lehnert analysis in their brief,
the court focused on the Regents' asserted interest in education, which included allowing the students to share in the
governance of the university system. 6
The court found that the Regents' interest in education
was vital, but not so vital as to justify the compulsion of funding of "private or quasi-private activity."22' As a central component of its analysis, the court borrowed from the labor union
cases the notion that there must be a "common cause" to justify the compulsion of funding.228 To justify fee expenditures in
an agency shop agreement, the "common cause" analysis requires that the non-union and union workers have a shared
interest in the expenditure of the fee.229 Here, the court decided that a "common cause" was absent.2 30 The court opined
that, while the Regents and the objecting students had a "common cause" in education, there was no "common cause" be-

220

See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 727 n.8.

221 See id.
22 See id. at 727.
223

Id.

22 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 220-22 (1977).
22 See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 15 (1990).
226 See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 727.
22 Id. The court did not determine whether the students' shared governance of

the university was a vital interest. See id.
228

Id. at 727-28.

22

Id. at 728.

20 Southworth, 151 F.3d at 728.
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tween the political and ideological groups and the objecting
students due to their disparate views."'
The Regents further asserted that, as in Abood, there
would be a free-rider problem if objecting students were not
required to fund activities open to them and all UWM studentsY2 Here, the court rejected the Regents' free-rider argument by distinguishing a university from a union shop."
The court reasoned that, under the principle of union exclusivity, the government imposes on the union the duty to fairly
represent the interests of both union and non-union employees." 4 Conversely, in the university context, a free-rider problem would not arise because the campus organizations do not
exist in a representative capacity and do not furnish the objecting students with a "free" benefit.235 To reject the Regents'
argument, the court recognized the inherent contextual differences that render the free-rider concern absent and inapplicable in Southworth."
Lastly, in the third prong of the analysis, the court addressed whether the compelled funding significantly added to
the burdening of free speech inherent in a mandatory fee systemY7 This prong acknowledges that there will be an incidental burden on speech when the government compels funding, but such a burden can be justified by an important governmental interest.238 Although it claimed to have concluded
that the Regents had no "vital governmental interest," the
court assumed arguendo that such an interest existed.239
Thus, the court determined that the Regents' distribution of
compelled fees to political and ideological groups significantly
added to the burden on the objecting students' free speech
rights under the First Amendment.24 °
Quoting Lehnert, the court explained that the intensity of
the objecting students' disagreement with the political and
231

Id.
SSee id.
See id.

"'

See id.
Southworth, 151 F.3d at 728.
See id.
See id. at 729.

'

See id.

239

Id.
See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 729.

'2"
26

2"'
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ideological groups was relevant in determining the extent of
the burden on their speech rights.24 ' Accordingly, since the
objecting students disagreed with the political and ideological
groups based on "deeply held religious beliefs," and since the
groups typically tackled "such emotionally charged issues as
abortion, homosexuality, and the United States' democratic
system," the court held that the fee policy was a particularly
great burden on the students.2 42 In response, the Regents asserted that, without funding to the political and ideological
groups, less speech, and less controversial speech, would result
on campus."4 The court rejected this argument on the
grounds that, while the Constitution does confer a right to free
speech, it does not guarantee funding for speech. 2
Within this third prong of the analysis the court quickly
addressed and rejected the Regents' remaining arguments
supporting the appropriation of funds from mandatory student
fees. First, the court addressed the Regents' assertion that the
district court erred in applying a mixed strict scrutiny and germaneness analysis.2 45 While the Seventh Circuit recognized
that the lower court did "intermingle" these tests, the possible
error was dismissed as harmless since the case was reviewed
de novo on appeal.246
Second, the court rejected the Regents' claim that there
was no evidence that the mandatory fees were being used to
fund groups' actual political and ideological activities.2 47 Like
the court below, the Seventh Circuit found that this claim was
an irrelevant matter of bookkeeping and noted that a similar
claim was rejected in Abood.248
Third, the Regents argued that the First Amendment was
not violated because the political and ideological groups did not
profess to speak for all students.24 9 Also in accordance with
the opinion of the court below, the Seventh Circuit rejected
241 See id. at 729; see also Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 521-

22 (1991) (plurality).
242 Southworth, 151 F.3d at 729.
21 See id.
2" See
245 See
246

id. at 729-30.
id. at 731.

Id.

247 See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 732.
248

See id.
id.

211 See
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this argument as irrelevant, finding that it did not matter whether a third party attributed a group's views to an
objecting student."
Fourth, the Regents sought to distinguish Abood and
Keller because the objecting students had the university's democratic process available to them."' While the court acknowledged that the non-union teachers in Abood did not have
the union's democratic process, the court noted that this was
not the case in KellerY 2 Essentially, the court did not address the availability of the democratic process to the objecting
students because Keller had not distinguished bar dues from
agency shop fees on this basis."'
Lastly, the Regents relied on a case upholding the
legislature's appropriation of tax funds to political and ideological groups, and a campaign finance reform case, to support the
Regents' similar expenditure of student fees." 4 Relying on
O'Connor's concurrence in Rosenberger, the court distinguished
the tax appropriation cases using the rationale that the student fee is not characterized as a tax, but a fund belonging to
the students. 5
In conclusion, the court granted the objecting students'
declaratory relief, holding that the Regents' funding of political
and ideological groups with objecting students' mandatory fees
violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. 6
As a result of its decision on the free speech claim, the court
did not separately or singularly discuss whether the free association claim strengthened the objecting students' constitutional argument.5 However, the court did consider the free association clause to the extent it relied on the union shop cases,

o See id.

251 See id.
22

See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 732.
See id.

id. The Regents relied on Libertarian Party of Indiana u. Packard, 741
F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that Indiana's scheme of raising revenue from
personalized license plates, then distributing part of the revenue to political parties, was not a violation of the First Amendment), and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976) (holding, in part, that limits on candidates' expenditures on their own
campaigns violated the right to freedom of speech).
25.See

2. See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 732.
2"6 See id. at 732-33.
27 See id. at 733 n.15.
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which hinged on an indistinct hybridization of the free speech
and association clauses.
Having addressed the issues of declaratory relief, the Seventh Circuit discussed the district court's order granting injunctive relief.259 The district court had ordered that the Regents "cease the funding of private groups that engage in ideological or political advocacy."260 Further, the district court
had ordered that the Regents publish written notice setting
forth organizations that engaged in political and ideological
activities, including a determination of each student's pro
rata share of fees to be

allocated to such activities. 261'

The

Regents were to submit to arbitration proceedings for disputes over amounts of fees paid and the nature of the
organizations involved.262
While, under Ellis,263 the district court had properly rejected the Regents' proposal for a refund system, 21 the Seventh Circuit found the district court's order to be, as worded,
over-broad. 265 The district court's order was over-broad because it mandated that the Regents cease the funding of political and ideological groups with all student fees, not just the
fees of those students objecting to the groups.66 In actuality,
the objecting students had challenged the funding of political
and ideological activities with their mandatory fees, not the
fees of non-objecting students. 26 Moreover, the district court's

order permitted the Regents to use mandatory fees only for
"activities reasonably intended to promote its educational mission."26" This mandate was over-broad because the objecting
students only challenged the appropriation of their mandatory

258 See supra Part I.B.

...See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 733.
260

Id.

See
262See
261 See
2" See
265See
266 See
26 See
268 Id.
261

id.
id.
supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
Southworth, 151 F.3d at 733.
id.
id.
id. at 733-34.
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fees to political and ideological groups with which they disagreed, they had not challenged the appropriation of their
mandatory fees to fund groups that did not engage in political
or ideological activities." 9
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit vacated the injunction to
the extent that it ordered "detailed and specific procedures" for
the Regents to perform."' The detailed measures of the district court's injunction implicated notions of federalism because
the Board of Regents is an agency of state government.2 7 1
Since the district court had not first given the Regents a
chance to comply with a broader injunction, it could not fashion a mandatory injunction with the specificity reserved for
extreme cases of noncompliance. 2
III. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Seventh Circuit's employment of the Lehnert analysis
did not clearly articulate a standard for reviewing the Regents'
interest in relation to the constitutionality of the compelled
funding. In each of the three prongs of the Lehnert analysis,
the court posed a different standard for assessing the interests
offered by the Regents. In the first prong of the analysis, the
"germaneness" prong, the court stated that the interests offered by the Regents to justify the compelled funding had to be
"legitimate."2 73 This legitimacy standard of the first prong is
less stringent than the standard imposed by the second prong
of the analysis, which requires that the compelled funding be
justified by "vital" policy interests. 4 Lastly, in the third
prong of the analysis, the court assessed whether the burden
imposed on the objecting students by the mandatory fee was
justified by an "important" governmental interest. 5 While
each of these prongs referred to the Regents' interest in education, it is unclear whether that interest needed to be "legitimate," "vital," or "important," to justify the compelled funding.

29 See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 734.

at 734.
id.
id.
2'3Id. at 724.
2'0 Id.

21 See
272 See

2" Southworth, 151 F.3d at 727.
275 Id. at 729.
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Without a clear standard of review, the notion of education as
a vital interest was obscured, and the objecting students' interests were doubly counted.
Moreover, while the district court announced the Hudson
strict scrutiny standard requiring that a First Amendment
infringement serve a "compelling state interest," 276 the Sev-

enth Circuit did not articulate any level of scrutiny. In Smith,
the California Supreme Court applied the Hudson strict scrutiny test.27 7 However, in dissent, Justice Arabian observed

that neither Abood nor Keller had announced a level of scrutiny, and that the Second Circuit in Carrollhad applied a "middle-tier test."278 While the three prong Lehnert inquiry employed in Southworth drew up three distinct and orderly avenues of analysis, it likewise never clearly articulated the level
of scrutiny applicable to compulsory fee cases.27 9 Further, in

Rounds, decided subsequent to Southworth, the Ninth Circuit
articulated what it dubbed an "intermediate level of scrutiny."280 Quoting the Lehnert Court, the Ninth Circuit required

that the expenditures of mandatory student fees be "adequately supported by a governmental interest."281 Certainly, even
Rounds fails to qualify the standard the government's interest
must meet, requiring only that the interest be "adequate."282
Therefore, the level of scrutiny applicable to mandatory student fee cases remains largely unclear, and the Southworth
decision, by articulating a different level of scrutiny in each
prong of the analysis, does little to clarify this sloppy and confusing area of the law.

276 Southworth v. Grebe, No. 96-C-0292-S, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at *12

(W.D. Wis. Nov. 29, 1996).
27 Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 506 (Cal. 1993).
271 Id. at 523.
271 See, e.g., Joseph A. Ciucci, Note, Defining the Permissible Uses of Objecting

Members' Agency Dues: Solution Any Clearer After Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty
Ass'n?, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 89, 107-08 (1992).
"8 Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir.
1999).
28 Id. (quoting Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 518 (1991)).
" Rounds, 166 F.3d at 1037.
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A. Germaneness:Education as a Legitimate Interest
In the first prong of its analysis, the Seventh Circuit set a
standard of legitimacy for the Regents' interest to justify compelled funding.283 However, while it announced this standard,
the court did not address the legitimacy of the Regents' interest in compelling funding because it noted that the objecting
students had not claimed that the Regents lacked a legitimate
interest. 284 Instead, without discussing the "legitimacy" of the
Regents' interest the court skipped to the question of "gerinaneness" and found that the compelled funding was not "ger5
mane" to the broad interest in educationY This conclusion did not rest on an evaluation of the government's
interest in education or its power to insure the achievement of
its interest. The court determined that the compelled funding was not "germane" to the Regents' interest in education
based not on "legitimacy," but on the ethereal and broad
nature of education.28 6
The court did not determine more narrowly whether the
appropriation of mandatory fees to political and ideological
student organizations was germane to a university chartered
to disseminate and apply knowledge in "the search for
truth."28 7 Instead, the court found the interest in education
28 The court
too broad to justify the compulsion of speech.
based the broadness of the Regents' interest in education on
289
the precedent of Abood and its progeny. In relying on the
labor and bar contexts, the court failed to recognize its own
2
musing that "everything is in a sense educational." 1 This
recognition of the broadness of education should not have likened Southworth to Abood and Keller, but should have distinguished it instead. As the Regents had argued, the interest of

" See Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 724 (7th Cir. 1998).
284 See id.
285 Id.
286Id. at 725.
287 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 36.01(2) (West 1998).

2' See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 725.
289 See id.

290 Id.
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education can be broader than the limited interests of the bar
or a union, and thus, may encompass a larger array of
"germane" activities.29 '
None of the decisions in this context that employ the germaneness analysis defines the word "germane." The American
Heritage College Dictionary defines the word "germane" as
"being both pertinent and fitting."2 2 In assessing the "ger-

maneness" of the Regents' interest in education, the court
ignored the meaning of the word "germane." The court determined that the funding of political and ideological groups was
not "germane" to the Regents' interest in education because the
groups were open to students and non-students and that such
funding was not necessary to the groups' existence.'
First, the fact that the political and ideological organizations were open to both students and non-students does not
change their pertinence to the UWM's educational mission. By
statute, the UWM is, inter alia, directed "to extend knowledge
and its application beyond the boundaries of its campus-

es . .

"294

This extension of knowledge would be impossible

without interaction between student and non-student groups.
Second, it is not clear why the court found the necessity of
funding relevant to the question of whether certain appropriations were "germane" to the interest of education. "Germaneness," described by the dictionary as "being pertinent and
fitting,"29 ' does not rely on necessity. Just because the student groups may not need funding to exist, one cannot assume
that the funding is not "germane" to the educational mission of
the university. Moreover, even if "germaneness" depends upon
necessity, it is doubtful that these political and ideological
groups could exist to a meaningful extent without a grant from
the mandatory student fees." 6 In his dissent in Smith, Justice Arabian commented, "[wlithout such funding,... I have

29 See id.; see also Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 520
(Cal. 1993) (Arabian, J., dissenting).
24 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 571 (3d ed. 1993).
' Southworth, 151 F.3d at 725.
294 Wis. STAT. ANN.

§ 36.01(2) (West 1998).

295THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 571 (3d ed. 1993).
296 See RALPH NADER

& DONALD Ross, ACTION FOR A CHANGE: A STUDENTS
MANUAL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST ORGANIZING 33-34 (Grossman Publishers 1971).
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would lose much of the diversity
no doubt that the campus
2 97
lifeblood."
which is its
Most significantly, these arguments do speak to the legitimacy of the interest offered by the Regents, which the objecting students had not challenged and which the court originally
said it would not address.
Furthermore, in assessing whether compelled funding was
"germane" to the Regents' interest in education, the court
found that the political and ideological groups only offered
8
"incidental" educational benefits.11 The groups, the court determined, were primarily concerned with promoting their own
political agendas. 99 By creating this dichotomy between incidental and primary benefits of student groups, the court neglected the judiciary's traditional philosophy of the university
0
as a "marketplace of ideas."" Under this tradition, the focus
would not be the primary motive of the political or ideological
organization, but the educational value of the existence of
another point of view.
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit, or perhaps the Regents,
never attempted to narrow the interest of education in order to
make it more palatable for the court to analyze. For example,
if the Regents had argued with reference to its statutorily
enacted mission,'°I there would have been more words and
concepts for the court to employ in its "germaneness" analysis.
This would have been helpful in focusing and limiting the
ethereal and omnipresent nature of education. Moreover, neither the court nor the Regents proposed, as in Carroll,302 a
narrowing of the ideological and political organizations' activities in order to make them more "germane" to the university
to create less of an infringement on the objecting
and
students' rights.

Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 527 (Cal. 1993) (Arabian, J., dissenting).
29 Southworth, 151 F.3d at 725.
29"

299 See id.

See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting United
States v. Associated Press, D.C., 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)); see also
infra note 365 and accompanying text.
301See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 36.01 (West 1998).
232 See supra notes 105-111 and accompanying text.
"'
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Thus, the court's "germaneness" analysis was confused
because it first recognized that the objecting students had not
challenged the legitimacy of the Regents' interest in compelled
funding. By only challenging the use of their own fees to support political and ideological groups with which they disagreed,
the objecting students were not questioning the "germaneness"
of compelled funding to the Regent's interest in education. If
the objecting students had argued that the compelled funding
was not "germane" to the Regents' interest in education, the
students would have argued against the funding of all political
and ideological groups, including those with which they agreed
and identified. The court's assessment of the broadness of
education referred to the elusive nature and definition of the
interest itself, which in turn referred to the legitimacy it summarily dismissed as unchallenged. In its analysis, the court
blurred the edges between the legitimacy of the interest in
education and the "germaneness" of that interest to the allocation of mandatory fees.
B. The Justificationof the Compelled Funding: Education as a
Vital Interest
In the second prong of the Lehnert analysis the court addressed whether the compelled fee was justified by a "vital"
policy interest.3 ' Since the Regents had not mentioned this
prong in their brief, the court focused on the Regents' expressed interest in education and the shared governance of the
university." 4 The court should have recognized that education is a "vital" interest, even in relation to the allocation of
mandatory fees. Instead, the court determined that the interest in education was "no doubt" vital, but not vital enough to
justify compelled funding.0 5 The court furthered this conclusion based on the notion of a "common cause" identified
in Lehnert."'

See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 727.
3" See id.
3 Id. The court never determined whether the Regents' interest in the shared
governance of the university was a vital interest.
3" See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 727-728; see also Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty
Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 521 (1991).
'"
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In Lehnert, the Supreme Court found that union expenditures unrelated to collective-bargaining did not further the
vital policy interests behind agency shop fees because the expenditures caused a dissonance between the goals of the union
and the workers." 7 In essence, the discord instigated by the
expenditures was inimical to the government's interest in labor
peace. In Southworth, the Seventh Circuit described this idea
of the Lehnert Court as the "importance of a common cause for
justifying compelled funding.""' However, the Court's notion
of a "common cause" was ill fit in its application to the tension
of interests presented by Southworth. This misapplication
resulted primarily from the inherent distinction between the
union shop and the university, a distinction the court later
9
recognized to reject the Regents' free-rider argument." Most
significantly, unlike a union, a university does not exist in a
representative capacity.310 Instead, the university is unique
in its ability to enfold contradicting factions and still be
squarely within its purpose. This tension of ideas is integral to
the university setting, whereas such debate could be harmful
to an effective and exclusive representative body.
In Southworth, the Regents' interest in appropriating
objecting students' mandatory fees to political and ideological
organizations was not inimical to its interest in education.
Unlike the goal of "labor peace," the object and legacy of education is the debate and opposition of ideas."' While the Seventh Circuit resolved that there may have been a "common
cause" of education between the Regents and the objecting
students, the court found no "common cause" between the
objecting students and the political and ideological organizations they opposed.3 12 The court's determination failed to rec-

"

See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 728; see also Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 521.
Southworth, 151 F.3d at 727.
See id. at 728.

310

See id. ("The reason a free-rider problem exists in the context of unions,

'

however, is significant (and in the case of student organizations lacking): In the
case of unions, the government has imposed on unions the duty to fairly represent
").
all employees . .
311 See DAVID MEABON ET AL., A STUDENT ACTIVITY FEE PRIMER: CURRENT RESEARCH ON COLLECTION, CONTROL AND ALLOCATION 21 (1985) ("In conclusion,
courts agree that colleges and universities are arenas where ideas and beliefs,
whether accepted or rejected, should and will challenge each other.").
312 Southworth, 151 F.3d at 728. In refuting the existence of a "common cause,"
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ognize that the tension between the objecting students and the
political and ideological groups did not sever a "common cause"
in education. The aim of the UWM was not frustrated by a
tension between the political and ideological values of the
organizations and the objecting students."' 3 Remarkably, this
discord among students does not frustrate, but rather, serves
to further the educational mission of the university. In the
university context, the opposition of beliefs serves to refine
ideas and heighten students' "intellectual, cultural and
humane sensitivities."314
Furthermore, in creating this "common cause" analysis,
the court never reviewed the interest in education separately
from the labor or bar context. The court failed to explore the
cultural values and expectations placed on educational institutions and the "vital" interests they serve for our country as a
whole and for our immediate communities.
C. The Burdening of "Speech": Education as an Important
Interest
In the third prong of its analysis, the court recognized that
a mandatory fee program might incidentally burden students'
speech rights.3 15 Therefore, the court questioned whether the
specific appropriation to political and ideological groups further
burdened the objecting students' First Amendment speech
rights. 16 With the outcome determined, the court stated
baldly that this added burden could be justified by an important governmental interest.3 17 However, the court confused
the court recognized the antagonistic relationship between the political and ideological organizations and the objecting students. Id. However, the remainder of the
opinion only addresses the First Amendment rights of the objecting students in
relation to the Regents, never considering the relationship between the organizations and the objecting students (or the effect of the holding on the organizations'
existence).
"' In fact, many students involved in the political and ideological organizations
challenged by the objecting students probably opposed the ideas espoused by other
organizations based on their own deeply held beliefs. This give and take in the
equal funding of viewpoints allows the university to encourage robust debate. Surprisingly, the court never discusses how widely the fees are distributed and how
more viewpoints could be represented if more students simply applied for funding.
314 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.01(2) (West
1998).
311See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 729.
316

See id.

317

See id. ("This prong recognizes that any time the government forces individu-
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the standard by reversing the appropriate line of questioning.
The court did not first consider whether there was an added
burden on the objecting students, then whether the added
burden could be justified by an important governmental interest. Instead, the court first assumed arguendo that an important government interest existed, then determined whether
there was an added burden on the objecting students. 8 ' This
reversed line of reasoning never discussed whether the Regents
truly had an important governmental interest and only addressed the added burden on the objecting students.
The court only mentioned the "important" governmental
interest standard in two brief sentences. 19 Once the court
established that the added burden could be justified by an
important governmental interest, the court provided: "Assuming there is a vital governmental interest in funding (which we
have concluded that there is not), the question then becomes
whether a specific expenditure adds to the burden on speech
inherent in the mandated funding of the organization in the
first instance." 2 ' Here, the court replaced the "important"
standard with the "vital" standard of the second prong. Certainly, a "vital" standard is more stringent than an "important"
standard. Thus, the court transposed the standards and
settled for its assessment in the second prong that the
Regents' interest was not "vital," when the interest could still
have been "important."
With a transposed standard, the court's backward order of
analysis discounted the Regents' interest, whether it need be
vital or merely important, because it never asked whether the
effected compulsion could be justified by the interest in education. The court, instead, measured the degree of the burden on
the objecting students based upon the "extent and source" of
the students' objections. 2 ' The court found an extreme burden on the objecting students since their disagreement

als to fund private organizations, a burden on free speech and association may
incidentally result, but that burden may be justified by an important governmental
interest.").
318

See id.

319 Id.
320 Southworth, 151 F.3d at 729.
321Id.
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stemmed from "deeply held religious and personal beliefs."322
However, the court never then determined whether the
Regents' interest in education was important, and thus, could
justify this added burden on the objecting students'
speech rights.
In failing to meaningfully assess the Regents' interest in
appropriating funds to political and ideological groups, the
court had a thumb on the scale in favor of the objecting students. In assessing only the extent of the burden on objecting
students, the court not only failed to question the importance
of the Regents' interest in education as a justification for the
appropriations, the court also overlooked the democratic process in place at the UWM.
The court quickly discounted the Regents' argument that
the university's democratic process distinguished Southworth
from Abood and Keller.3" The Regents argued that the objecting students could work through the democratic process, which
24
was a distinction from Abood not mentioned in Keller.
While the teachers in Abood, as non-union employees, did not
have the union's democratic process available to them, the
lawyers in Keller did. 5 The court rejected the Regents' argument because the Keller Court never addressed this distinction.326 Moreover, the court dismissed the power of the
Regents' argument because objecting students, if elected, would
-not be able to "de-fund organizations whose viewpoints they
327 In its analysis
opposed."
the court wrongfully precluded the
Regents from raising an important assertion merely because
the court and counsel failed to recognize the argument
in Keller.
It is significant that the UWM has a democratic process in
place because the objecting students could have (1) campaigned
to elect representatives whose views aligned more closely with
their own, (2) sought funding for their own groups which opposed the views or values expressed by the groups with which
they disagreed, (3) sought to change the university's policy in

322

Id.

32 See id. at 732.
..
4 See id.
31 See Southworth,
326 See id.
32'Id.

at 732 n.14.

151 F.3d at 732.
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granting funding from mandatory fees to political and ideological groups, or (4) sought to change the university's policy regarding how the political and ideological groups may expend
funds granted to them through mandatory fees. In a footnote,
the court mentions the futility of what it sees as the only available option to the objecting students within the democratic
process: trying to de-fund the groups with which they disagree.3" Thus, instead of working within the university's own
legislative process, the objecting students brought an action in
federal court to de-fund political and ideological organizations
at a state university.
The court found the Regents' democracy argument flawed
based on the notion that the First Amendment rights of minority individuals trump the democratic process.3 29 While this
maxim is well founded in terms of the positive speech rights of
the First Amendment, it is neither firmly grounded nor selfevident that the negative First Amendment rights of a minority trump the democratic process. Clearly, in terms of the positive rights of the free speech clause, a minority group of objectors may speak out or protest without invading the democratic
majority. However, while this democratic majority cannot stop
the minority from exerting their positive speech rights, it is
unclear when a democratic majority can no longer compel the
minority to follow fairly legislated decisions. There is no merit
in the argument that a democratic regime does not at times
force minority objectors to fund projects or values with which
they disagree-for example, taxes.33 Essentially, it is unclear
at what point the negative speech rights of the minority are
truly implicated by the majority's fairly elected decisions.
More concretely, based on the facts in Southworth, the
Regents' allocation of mandatory fees only affected the objecting students indirectly because they claimed that their negative speech rights were implicated by the allocation of their
mandatory fees to fund political and ideological groups. In
other words, the objecting students were not, and did not claim
to be, forced to join, or even participate, in the activities of the
groups with which they disagreed.3 31 Unlike the government
"'
"
"'
"t

See id.
See id. at 732.
See, e.g., Libertarian Party of Ind. v. Packard, 741 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1984).
The Ninth Circuit adopted this argument in Rounds, finding that the ob-
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forcing an individual to say the pledge of allegiance or post a
state motto on her license plate,332 the expenditure of the
mandatory fees did not force the objecting students to subscribe to any belief, and it did not represent that the objecting
students agreed with all the beliefs of all of the groups funded.
The students were not compelled, as in Barnette, to "confess by
word or act" belief in any message or viewpoint.33 3
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit relied on Lehnert, which in
turn relied on Wooly v. Maynard, to demonstrate that the First
Amendment protects the objecting students from the "type of
invasion" that "foster[s their] adherence to an ideological point
of view...." 3 3 4 This strong language is entirely out of context when applied to the Regents' mandatory fee system.
Through its appropriation of fees the Board of Regents was not
indoctrinating students to adhere to a set of beliefs or values.
It was actually quite the opposite, as the Regents did not require that the objecting students attend the political and ideological organizations' meetings or events. The appropriation
of the fees served only the purpose of ensuring the expression of diverse viewpoints,33 5 not the indoctrination of
specific viewpoints.
In addition, more practically, when the court focused on
the burden on the objecting students, it failed to recognize the
meager pro rata share of each objecting students' fees appropriated to each political and ideological organization. Each
individual objecting student was forced to pay no more than a
few cents per semester to each political or ideological organization.336 This meager amount of money allowed the UWM students to host and encourage diverse debate. Likewise, given
jecting students were not compelled to become members of, or speak for, OSPIRG
EF, the organization with which they disagreed. See Rounds v. Oregon State Bd.
of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 1999).
See supra Part I.A.
West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
See Lemert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 521-22 (1991); see also
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
See Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 724 (7th Cir. 1998).
36 See Southworth v. Grebe, No. 96-C-0292-S, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at
*7-*8 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 29, 1996). In the first semester of 1996-1997 academic year,
only $6.48 of the students' $190.45 fee was distributed to the GSSF. See id. at *8.
Likewise, of the $190.45 semi-annual fee, only $4.63 was distributed to the ASM.
See id. Thus, each student paid a little over $10.00, which was in turn distributed
to some hundred organizations.
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that the fees were appropriated to groups representing a diverse array of viewpoints, the body of organizations that each
individual student supports with this small fee will likely even
out between groups with which she both agrees and disagrees.
Further, so long as mandatory fees are allocated to student groups on a content neutral basis-that is regardless of
the views they espouse-there is a valid argument that a limited public forum has been created by the University. 37 The
court did not accept the Regents' argument that the challenged
student groups were not, and were not perceived to be, the
voice of all students. The court overlooked the fact that the coexistence of all of the groups funded by mandatory student
fees, not just the eighteen with which the objecting students
disagreed, created a diverse forum for the interaction of
ideas-not unlike the fora created by the student newspapers in
cases like Kania3 5 or even Rosenberger v. Rector,3 39 one of
the ADF's very own battles.
In conclusion, the Regents' allocation of mandatory student
fees to political and ideological organizations required the court
to balance the objecting students' right to be free from compelled speech against the Regents' interest in maintaining the
appropriations for their educational value.340 Utilizing an
unclear standard of review, relying on a line of labor law cases
ill-fit in the university context, neglecting to recognize education as a vital interest, disregarding the university's own
means by which the burden on objecting students' rights could
be limited, and failing to recognize the adverse effect of its
holding on the student organizations, the court found that the
burden on the objecting students was not justified by the Re-

' The Ninth Circuit embraced the university as a limited public forum in
Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1038-40 n.5 (9th Cir.
1999).
'

See supra notes 91-95.

3" 515 U.S. 819 (1995); see supra note 90. In Rosenberger, the Court required a
public university to consider the funding of a religious student newspaper, neutral
to its views, because the university funded other newspapers representing divergent viewpoints, thus, creating a public forum. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840.
Essentially, the ADF wanted deeply religious students to "have their cake and eat
it too"-i.e., religious campus papers should be considered for funding because of
the right to freedom of speech and association, despite the separation of church
and state; yet, all groups that offend religious students' beliefs should not be funded because of the religious students' freedom of speech and association.
"' See Southworth, 151 F.3d at 732.
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gents' interest in education. This balancing test weighed heavily the objecting students' underlying claim to "freedom of
mind," which yielded the paradoxical result of a more uniform
and colorless educational institution. The seminal negative
speech rights cases invalidated indoctrination because "compulsory unification of opinion only achieves the unanimity of the
graveyard." 4 ' Underlying this powerful language is the notion that the First Amendment protects diversity of thought.
decision in
the
and
paradoxically,
Unfortunately,
Southworth repudiates the precedent on which it relies by
threatening the exchange of disparate political and ideological
speech at public universities.
IV.

THE AFTERMATH OF SOUTHWORTH

While the Seventh Circuit properly limited the district
court's injunctive order, its decision in Southworth effectively
abrogates a system of mandatory fee distribution designed to
foster the exchange of diverse viewpoints. While the court held
it unconstitutional to appropriate objecting students' fees to
groups with which they disagreed, the practical implications of
researching which students agree and disagree with which
groups effectively eliminates the program. Administratively, it
is inefficient and costly for the Regents to sift out and match
up objectors and non-objectors to each political and ideological
group funded through the mandatory fee program.342 Accordingly, the Regents most efficient and cost-effective way of complying with the court's decision is to cease funding political and
ideological groups altogether.343 Forced to rely on donations,
many of these politically and ideologically active groups will
waste most of the short school year trying to secure funding.3 " Moreover, given the financial burden already presented by exorbitant college tuition bills, students will be discour-

Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
court rejected the Regents' administrative efficiency argument. See
Southworth, 151 F.3d at 733.
" See Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 519 (Cal. 1993)
(Arabian, J., dissenting).
314See NADER & ROSS, supra note 296, at 34 ("Instead of obtaining educational
benefits by performing substantive research, students would be continually forced
to devise ways of raising money.").
3. West
342 The
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aged from actively participating in extracurricular groups that
require them to pay dues.34 5 In effect, political and ideological
organizations will go out of print, withering the extracurricular
debate so vital to the university and the democracy it serves.
In the aftermath of the Seventh Circuit's decision, there
are, however, arguments other universities might make, or
actions they might take, in order to maintain the appropriation
of mandatory student fees to organizations like the eighteen
challenged by the objecting students in Southworth. 6
First, since Southworth held, without any discussion of its
basis, that the Regents could not appropriate mandatory activity fees to private organizations, a university may argue that
the political and ideological groups funded through the appropriation of student fees are public organizations. In fact, in its
compliance with the Southworth court's decision, the Wisconsin
Regents could argue that the campus groups, including the
eighteen cited in the law suit, are not private organizations.
These student groups are creatures of the public university,
and their funding is derived from public money. Moreover, the
groups are not exclusive in nature, a characteristic attributed
to private organizations, instead, they are opened to all
interested individuals.
The plaintiffs, or objecting students, might argue in response that the political and ideological groups are private if
they mirror or elect the name of a larger private organization
that exists outside the university campus. While it is unclear whether this would nominate the organization a private one, universities could nevertheless counsel their student organizations to adopt different names without compromising their missions.
Second, universities, including perhaps the Regents in its
compliance with the Southworth decision, may likewise argue

" The amount of dues it would cost each interested student to participate in
an organization would by far exceed the costs of submitting to a fee system that
spreads costs over, and benefits, the entire university population.
'
In fact, a committee of students and administrators at UWM defined two options for compliance with the Southworth ruling. The committee proposed to define
which groups are political and ideological and then to let objecting students opt
out of funding those groups. Alternatively, the committee proposed to allow students to opt out of paying for all groups. See Gwen Carleton, UW Weighs Options
in Fee Suit, THE CAPITAL TMIES, Oct. 29, 1998 at 4A, available in 1998 WL
14536280.
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that the student groups do not engage in political or ideological
activities. In Keller, the Supreme Court warned that "those
activities having political or ideological coloration... will not
always be easy to discern.""4 Universities may take advantage of the fuzzy line between what constitutes and does not
constitute a political or ideological activity. Many of the eighteen groups cited by the objecting students could more aptly be
termed "cultural" or "ethnic" groups. For example, the Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual Campus Center could argue that their activities
are neither political nor ideological in nature, but instead, the
group exists as a social and support network. Likewise, a
group like the Madison AIDS Support Network could argue
that their activities are neither political nor ideological in nature, but instead, that their activities include health education
and disease prevention.
Moreover, a student organization of a multifarious nature
could argue that only some of its activities are political and
ideological and utilize the funding from mandatory fees to
sponsor its other events. For example, the Campus Women's
Center could use its funding to maintain health education and
support networks, yet solicit funding from elsewhere to support
its political activities. However, many of the groups the objecting students cited in Southworth are at "extreme ends of the
spectrum," 4 ' and with clearly political and ideological missions, they cannot colorably claim otherwise.3 '
Third, a university faced with a challenge to the expenditure of mandatory student fees to fund political and ideological
groups might offer a more narrow interest than "education" to
justify the compelled funding. Since the Seventh Circuit found
that the Regents' interest in education was too broad to be
"germane" to the compelled funding, in the future a university
should argue its interests with reference to its statutorily en-

" Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1990); see also Robert M.
O'Neil, Student Fees & Student Rights: Evolving Constitutional Principles, 25 J.C.
& U.L. 569, 579 (1999) (discussing the difficulty in determining which groups are
"political and ideological" in nature).
"'
Keller, 496 U.S. at 16.
"'
Further, as suggested by Rounds, the organization could "bisect political and
educational functions" so as to limit the use of its funding to educational activities. Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir.
1999). This, however, presupposes that the determination of educational and political functions is easily made. See, e.g., infra note 353.
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acted mission statement. For example, if the Regents had argued that their interests reflected those set forth in § 36.01 of
the Wisconsin statute, the broad and ethereal nature of "education" may have been circumvented. While the language of
the statute is still rather lofty and broad, it offers the court
more narrow notches and phrases in which to apply its "gerinaneness" analysis."' Likewise, in Carroll, SUNY Albany
advanced "three distinct reasons" for appropriating mandatory
fees to NYPIRG. 5 1 These specific reasons gave the Second
Circuit more narrow facets in which to focus its analysis and
might explain the case's more diplomatic outcome.
Fourth, also in consonance with the Second Circuit's compromise in Carroll, a university might enact a policy that requires political and ideological student organizations to spend
as much money on activities on campus as they receive from
the university through mandatory fees. 52 This policy would
guarantee that objecting students like those in Southworth
only fund activities that occur on campus and encourage the
exchange of ideas for primarily educational benefits. Further,
this policy would limit the objecting students' contributions to
lobbying and marches because the organizations would have to
raise their own funding to participate in such activities. In
effect, under this policy, the university could substantially curtail the infringement on objecting students' negative speech
rights and make the educational benefits of the organizations
less incidental to their political agendas. 3

...For example, the interest of education would have been narrowed if the
Board of Regents had argued that one of its interests in appropriating mandatory
fees to political and ideological organizations was "to extend knowledge and its
application beyond the boundaries of its campuses." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.01(2)
(West 1998). Likewise, some of the Seventh Circuit's focus on certain factual findings, like the fact that the groups were opened to students and non-students,
could have been diverted. In addition, the need for legislative deference would
have been more pronounced.
...Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991, 999 (2d Cir. 1992). In Carroll, the university advanced the following three interests: (1) promotion of extracurricular activities, (2) the encouragement of "participatory civics training", and (3) the instigation
of "robust campus debate on a variety of public issues." Id.
352 See id. at 1002.
" See Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 519 (Cal. 1993)
(Arabian, J., dissenting) ("The dichotomy between 'educationally beneficial' and
'ideological' speech is a false and pernicious one.").
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Fifth, a university might be tempted to include the activity
fee in the amount of tuition. While it would be unclear how a
challenge to the expenditures would come out under this
changed set of facts, it is not an intellectually honest way for a
university to circumvent the First Amendment issues inherent
in a mandatory fee system.3 54
Lastly, though the argument was rejected by the district
court355 and was not addressed by the Seventh Circuit, a university faced with a challenge similar to the Regents in
Southworth might make the argument that it is a "public forum." Essentially, the university would argue, as in the newspaper cases, that it grants funding to political and ideological
campus groups because, as a public forum, it must grant money on a viewpoint neutral basis.355 The district court rejected

' See NADER & ROSS, supra note 296. Even in this pamphlet, the authors and
advocates for PIRGs admit that mandatory fees, while guaranteeing funding, are
"shamelessly coercive." Id. at 35. To lessen this coercion, the authors suggest a
refund system for the minority objectors. See id. at 36. However, to remain consistent in its agency shop analysis, the Seventh Circuit had to reject this suggestion
because of Ellis, which held that a union's system of refunding political and ideological expenditures was unconstitutional. See Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline
and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employes, 466 U.S.
435, 444 (1984); see also Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 733 (7th Cir. 1998).
See Southworth v. Grebe, No. 96-C-0292-S, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20980, at
*32 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 29, 1996). The district court found that,
fiun this case, there are clearly many instances where portions of the
segregated fee are being used to create a forum for student organizations
to express their views. However, there are a number of situations where
portions of the segregated fee are being used clearly to fund political or
ideological activity, not to provide a forum for the free exchange of ideas.
Id.
356 See, e.g., Veed v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp 149 (D. Neb. 1973)
(public
university did not violate freedom of association by financing a student newspaper
and a speakers program with mandatory student fees because the institution did
not advocate for the philosophy espoused by the paper or the speakers), affd, 478
F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1973); Good v. Associated Students, 86 Wash. 2d 94 (1975)
(public university may constitutionally fund political and ideological student groups
with student activities fees as long as the school does not promote any particular
viewpoint). For a detailed discussion of the argument that a university is a public
forum in the mandatory fee context, see Janine G. Bauer, Note, The Constitutionality of Student Fees for Political Student Groups in the Campus Public Forum:
Galda v. Bloustein and the Right to Associate, 15 RUTGERs L.J. 135 (1983); Kari
Thoe, Note, A Learning Experience: Discovering the Balance Between Fees-Funded
Public Fora and Compelled-Speech Rights at American Universities, 82 MINN. L.
REv. 1425 (1998); William Walsh, Comment, Smith v. Regents of the University of
California: The Marketplace is Closed, 21 J.C. & U.L. 405 (1994); Carolyn Wiggin,
Note, A Funny Thing Happens When You Pay For A Forum: Mandatory Student
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this argument because it appeared that there were circumstances where the funding from the mandatory fees was not
used by political and ideological organizations to create a forum for speech. In Southworth, the Seventh Circuit did not
squarely address the public forum argument, but the Ninth
Circuit in Rounds embraced the doctrine, distinguishing
Rounds from Southworth on that ground."5 7 It is unclear how
such an argument will fare in the future-hopefully the Supreme Court will clarify this area in its review of the Seventh
Circuit decision. It can be stated with certainty, however, that
a university's stress on the neutrality of the fund-granting
process, and the university's encouragement that groups represent more than one side of a contentious issue, could weigh
heavily if clearly argued. In making a public forum argument,
the university must demonstrate that- the aggregate of the
groups, not each individual group, or all the groups with which
the objecting students disagree, together create a forum for
diverse expression.5 '
Thus, there are still plausible arguments that a university
can raise, or actions a university can take, that may help it to
survive a First Amendment challenge to the appropriation of
mandatory fees to fund political and ideological campus organizations. Presently, the ADF has two nearly identical pending
actions in both Minnesota and Ohio.359 Moreover, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Southworth to determine
"[wihether the First Amendment is offended by a policy or
program under which public university students must pay
mandatory fees that are used in part to support organizations
that engage in political speech."8 ' The Supreme Court's decision will help further define the future of, and the arguments
to be made for, the appropriation of mandatory student activity
fees to fund political and ideological student organizations.

Fees to Support PoliticalSpeech at Public Universities, 103 YALE L.J. 2009 (1994).
...See Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1040 n.5
(9th Cir. 1999).
3s, See MEABON ET AL., supra note 311, at 21.
9 See Brakken, supra note 4, at 13; ONeil, supra note 347, at 569.
3' 119 S. Ct. 1332 (Mar. 29, 1999).
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CONCLUSION

In Southworth, the Seventh Circuit did not clearly articulate a standard for reviewing the constitutionality of the allocation of mandatory fees to fund political and ideological student
organizations. It is unclear whether the Regents' interest in
education had to be 'legitimate," "vital" or "important" to justify the burden on the objecting students' First Amendment
rights. Nevertheless, by the most stringent of the recited standards, education, especially as set forth in the UWM's statutory mission, is a "vital" interest which may justify the funding
of political and ideological groups with mandatory fees.
The Southworth decision raises fundamental questions for
universities, students, and courts to consider. For example,
does the allocation of money, without any other act, amount to
speech?3 ' Does it amount to association? Were the objecting
students, by solely paying a mandatory fee, compelled to associate with, and speak for, groups with which they disagreed?
Furthermore, Southworth has powerful political significance because it demonstrates how a conservative and religious legal organization can utilize the discourse of individual
rights to judicially effect a de-funding of viewpoints which it
opposes. Should judges heed these political underpinnings not
argued or briefed by lawyers who present such cases? Is this
judicial activism appropriate in a federal court to effect
changes at a localized university?" 2 Does this model of litigation empower those with the economic upper hand to de-fund
viewpoints with which they disagree? After all, the objecting
students did not seek out the lawyers at the ADF to recapture
the couple of dollars they each indirectly lost when the Regents
appropriated their mandatory fees.363

361See J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85

YALE L.J. 1001, 1019 (1976).
" For example, similar cases have heralded judicial deference to the academic
judgment of the university. See, e.g., Veed v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp. 149 (D.
Neb. 1973) ("Our states, through their colleges and universities, must retain the
freedom and flexibility to put before their students a broad range of ideas in a
variety of contexts. The wisdom or political desirability of the specific route chosen
is not a question to be determined by the courts."), affd, 478 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir.
1973).
" The ADF devoted more than $500,000 to the Southworth lawsuit.
See
Brakken, supra note 4, at 13.
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The Seventh Circuit chilled robust student debate by holding that the funding of political and ideological groups through
the mandatory fee program violated the objecting students'
negative speech rights. Without funding, many of the political
and ideological groups will not survive. Public universities will
"lose much of the diversity which is [their] lifeblood.""' Consequently, the court's holding will atrophy the interactive,
extracurricular debate so central to the university and the
democracy it serves. Justice Brennan commented, "The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to
that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a
multitude of tongues...

'"

In Southworth, the Seventh Cir-

cuit chilled the student debate so integral to the perfection of
truth, an aim of both the66UWM's mission and the guarantees
of the First Amendment.

Meredith R. Miller

Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 527 (Cal. 1993) (Arabi'"
an, J., dissenting).
3" Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting United
States v. Associated Press, D.C., 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
'" The mission statement of the Regents of the University of Wisconsin concludes, "[blasic to every purpose of the system is the search for truth." WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 36.01(2) (West 1998). This goal of "truth" underlies not only the UWM
system, but also the First Amendment guarantees of the United States Constitution. See JOHN B. HARRER, INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 2, 3 (1992).

